The Bayesian Solution and Hierarchies of Beliefs by Tang, Qianfeng
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Bayesian Solution and Hierarchies of
Beliefs
Qianfeng Tang
The University of Texas at Austin
9. November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26902/
MPRA Paper No. 26902, posted 22. November 2010 06:21 UTC
The Bayesian solution and hierarchies of beliefs
Qianfeng Tang
November 9, 2010
Abstract
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges
(1993), and hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are introduced by Ely and
P¾eski (2006) in their study of interim rationalizability. We study the connection be-
tween the two concepts. We say that two type spaces are equivalent if they represent
the same set of hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We show that the correla-
tion embedded in equivalent type spaces can be characterized by partially correlating
devices, which send correlated signals to players in a belief invariant way. Since such
correlating devices also implement the Bayesian solution, we establish that the Bayesian
solution is invariant across equivalent type spaces.
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1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1967-1968) proposes type spaces to model playersbeliefs and higher-order beliefs
in games with incomplete information, and later Mertens and Zamir (1985) constructs a
universal type space which incorporates all hierarchies of beliefs. These works provide the
foundations for strategic analysis in games with incomplete information. One phenomenon
that has recently attracts game theoristsattention is that, for a given solution concept, type
spaces and hierarchies of beliefs are not always strategically equivalent. To be more precise,
for any hierarchy of beliefs, there are multiple type spaces that could represent it. These type
spaces, although equivalent in the set of hierarchies of beliefs that they represent, may di¤er
in the amounts of correlations incorporated in the types; and these correlations potentially
matter for the behavioral prediction of various solution concepts.
The characterization of correlations embedded in type spaces with the same set of
Mertens-Zamir (conventional, hereafter) hierarchies of beliefs has been done in Liu (2005).
Liu shows that any redundant type spaces (ones in which multiple types of the same player
have the same hierarchy of beliefs) can be generated by operating a state-dependent corre-
lating mechanism on the non-redundant type space. The correlation provided by a state-
dependent correlating mechanism can be viewed as ex post, because in the mechanism, cor-
related signals are sent to players depending on information in the ex post stage of the
gameboth states of nature and playerstypes.
We focus on hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs, i.e., -hierarchies of beliefs,
which are introduced by Ely and p¾eski (2006); and we are interested in interim (stage) corre-
lations among players, i.e., the correlations that depend only on interim stage information
players types. We dene type spaces with the same set of -hierarchies of beliefs to be
equivalent, then show that correlations embedded in equivalent type spaces can be char-
acterized by partially correlating devices. Depending on players type proles, partially
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correlating devices send correlated signals to players in a belief invariant way in the interim
stage.
We use the following example to illustrate the di¤erence between interim and ex post
correlation.
Example 1. Consider a two-player game with payo¤ uncertainties parameterized by  =
f+1; 1g: The action sets of players are Ai = fai; big for i 2 f1; 2g; and the payo¤s of
playersare given by
a2 b2
a1 1; 1 0; 0
b1 0; 0 1; 1
 = +1
a2 b2
a1 0; 0 1; 1
b1 1; 1 0; 0
 =  1
Figure 1.
From the payo¤s, players would like to match their actions in state  = +1 and to
mismatch in state  =  1. Consider a type space T on  in which the sets of playerstypes
are described by T1 = T2 = f+1; 1g; and the type proles in T1T2 are equally distributed.
Suppose if t1 = t2;  = +1 and if t1 6= t2;  equals +1 or  1 each with probability 12 : With
no correlation in actions, the ex ante payo¤ for each player from playing any strategy is 1
2
:
To implement interim stage correlation, assume there is a mediator who observes both
playerstypes. When t1 = t2 ; the mediator tosses a coin; if the outcome is head (H), she tells
player 1 to play a1 and player 2 to play a2; and if the outcome is tail (T ), she tells player 1 to
play b1 and player 2 to play b2. Recommendations are privately made to each player. When
t1 6= t2, the mediators information on t does not provide her with any extra information on
, and she does not make recommendations. By following the mediators recommendations,
players match their actions perfectly with probability 1
2
. The ex ante expected payo¤ for
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each player is 3
4
.
To implement ex post correlation, assume there is a mediator who observes both players
types and the true state of nature. At both  = +1 and  =  1 the mediator tosses a coin.
When  = +1, the mediator recommends (a1; a2) at H and (b1; b2) at T ; and when  =  1;
the mediator recommends (a1; b2) at H and (b1; a2) at T . Recommendations are privately
made to each player. By following the mediators recommendations, players match their
actions perfectly in both states. The expected payo¤ for each player is 1.
Here the mediators role is exactly implementor of a partially correlating device and a
state-dependent correlating mechanism. Moreover, it is not di¢ cult to check that in the
interim stage correlation, the signals (recommendations) from the mediator do not change
players-hierarchies of beliefs1; and in the ex post correlation, the signals do not change
playersconventional hierarchies of beliefs. Further more, we can also see from the example
that signals from the ex post correlation change the set of conditional beliefs, and hence
change the set of -hierarchies of beliefs: prior to receiving signals, at t1 = +1, player 1s
belief over  conditional on player 2s type t2 =  1 is 12f = +1g + 12f =  1g; however,
after receiving signals, player 1s belief over  at type (+1; a1) conditional on player 2s type
( 1; a2); for example, becomes certainty of f = +1g.
For any type space and a partially correlating device, we can generate a larger type space
when we incorporate signals from the correlating device into playersprivate information; and
when signals are recommendations of actions, these newly generated type spaces are exactly
the epistemic models used by Forges (1993) in her denition of the Bayesian solution. A
partially correlating device is canonical if the set of signals a player could receive is exactly her
action set. Forges (2006) uses canonical partially correlating devices to explicitly implement
the Bayesian solution. Based on the characterization of correlations, we establish that the set
of Bayesian solution payo¤s on a type space is the union of Bayesian Nash equilibria payo¤s
1Please refer to Section 2.2 for explicit formulations of -hierarchies of beliefs.
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in its equivalent type spaces; and in an immediate corollary, we show that the Bayesian
solution is invariant across equivalent type spaces.
This paper relates most closely to Liu (2005), which characterizes the correlation embed-
ded in type spaces equivalent with respect to conventional hierarchies of beliefs and based on
that denes a notion of correlated equilibrium. Lehrer, Rosenberg and Shmaya (2006) studies
the relationship between type spaces that induce equivalent payo¤s under the Bayesian solu-
tion; the non-communicating garblings they use have similar features as partially correlating
devices.
This paper is organized as follows. We present notations and formulations of hierarchies
of beliefs in Section 2, and derive the characterization of correlations embedded in equivalent
type spaces in Section 3. Section 4 presents that the Bayesian solution is invariant across
equivalent type spaces. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Notations
We begin with some notations. For any metric space X; let X denote the space of prob-
ability measures on the Borel -algebra of X endowed with the weak-topology. Let the
product of two metric spaces be endowed with the product Borel -algebra. For any prob-
ability measure  2 X; denote supp the support of ; for any measure  2 (X  Y );
denote margX  the marginal distribution of  on X.
We study games with incomplete information with n players. The set of players is
N = f1; 2; :::; ng: For each i 2 N; let  i denote the set of is opponents. Players play a game
in which the payo¤s are uncertain and parameterized by a nite set : Each element  2 
is called a state of nature. For each i 2 N; denote Ai the set of actions for player i, and
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A  i2NAi the set of action proles: A (strategic form) game is a prole G = (gi; Ai)i2N .
For each i 2 N; we assume the payo¤ function is bounded: gi : A! [ M;M ]; for some
positive real number M . The set of nite bounded games is denoted by G.
A type space over  is dened as T = (Ti; i)i2N ; where for each i; Ti is a nite set of
types for player i and i : Ti ! (T i  ) is a mapping such that i(ti)[(t i; )] describes
player is belief on the event that the otherstype prole is t i and the state of nature is :
Throughout, given arbitrary x 2 X and y 2 Y; we use the notation i(x)[y] to denote
player is belief about y conditional on x. More precisely, the object in the round bracket
always denotes the object player i conditions on, and the object in the square bracket always
denotes the object player i assigns probability to.
2.2 Formulations of hierarchies of beliefs
We rst present Mertens and Zamirs standard formulation of hierarchies of beliefs (see also
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)), and based on that present Ely and P¾eskis construction
of -hierarchies of beliefs. For convenience, we call Mertens-Zamir hierarchy of beliefs the
conventional hierarchy of beliefs.
Let X0 = ; and for k  1; Xk = Xk 1  j 6=i(Xk 1): Let h1(ti) = marg i(ti);
which is player is belief over  at type ti: For each k  1; let hk(ti)[S] = i(ti)[f(; t i) :
(; (hl(t i))1lk 1) 2 Sg]; for any measurable subset S  Xk. In the construction, hk(ti) 2
(Xk 1) represents player is k-th order belief at ti. The prole h(ti) = (h1(ti); :::; hk(ti); :::) 2
1k=0Xk is called player is conventional hierarchy of beliefs at type ti:
A -hierarchy of beliefs describes a players belief and higher-order beliefs about con-
ditional beliefs on states of nature. The concept was introduced by Ely and P¾eski (2006)
in their study of interim independent rationalizability. We begin with dening conditional
beliefs. Given belief i(ti) 2 (T i); the conditional belief of type ti over ; conditioning
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on the otherstypes being t i; is i(ti)(t i) 2 , also written as i(ti; t i): For any type
space T , denote the set of all possible conditional beliefs at ti as Bi(ti) = fi(ti; t i) 2  :
t i 2 T ig: Type tis belief over T i then induces a belief over  : for any measurable
subset S  ; i(ti)[S] = i(ti)[ft i : i(ti; t i) 2 Sg]:
Now we can dene -hierarchy of beliefs at ti by treating the set of possible conditional
beliefs, i.e., ; as the set of basic uncertainties. Let the rst-order belief of a player be her
belief over the set of conditional beliefs, the second-order belief be her belief over the others
beliefs over the set of conditional beliefs, and so on.
Formally, for any type space T = (Ti; i)i2N on , we can transform it into a type
space T = (Ti; i )i2N on . In the new type space, playerstypes are unchanged, and
i (ti) 2 (T i ) is given by
i (ti)[S] = i(ti)[ft i : (t i; i(ti; t i)) 2 Sg];
for any measurable subset S  (T i ):
Denote the conventional hierarchy of beliefs at ti in the type space T as h(tijT).
Denition 1. For any type space T , for any k  1; let the k-th order -hierarchy of beliefs
at ti 2 Ti be hk(tijT) and denote it as k(ti). Also, denote the -hierarchy of beliefs at ti
as (ti) = (1(ti); :::; k(ti); :::).
By denition, (ti) = h(tijT). For player i, we use  i to denote the prole of the others
-hierarchies of beliefs.
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3 Characterization of correlations
3.1 Equivalence of type spaces
For any type space T , denote the set of all -hierarchies of beliefs that T has as (T ) =
f(ti) : ti 2 Ti; i 2 Ng. However, the set of -hierarchies of beliefs does not uniquely pin
down the type space, instead, multiple type spaces may induce the same set of -hierarchies
of beliefs.
Denition 2. Two type spaces T and T 0 are equivalent, write as T  T 0; if they have the
same set of -hierarchies of beliefs, that is, if
(T ) = (T 0):
A type space in which di¤erent types of a player always have di¤erent hierarchies of
beliefs is called a reduced type space (Aumann, 1998), or a non-redundant type space (Liu,
2005). For any conventional hierarchy of beliefs, we are able to construct such a type space
that generates it, but this is not true for -hierarchies of beliefs. We illustrate this with a
simple type space taken from Ely and P¾eski (2006).
Example 2. Consider a type space T in which  = T1 = T2 = f+1; 1g, and players
beliefs are updated from a common prior  2 ( T1  T2) such that
(t1; t2; ) =
8><>:
1
4
if ti  t2 = ;
0 otherwise.
In this type space, the set of conditional beliefs for each type contain point mass on
 = +1 and point mass on  =  1, and at each type of both players, the -hierarchy of
beliefs is common certainty of equal probability of the point masses. Moreover, type space
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T is the most compact one that supports this -hierarchy beliefs.
Although we can alternatively dene the most compact type space that generates a -
hierarchy of beliefs as non-redundant, we prefer not to do that here. Without distinguishing
non-redundant and redundant type spaces, we can achieve a partial characterization of the
correlation embedded in equivalent type spaces, which is su¢ cient for proving our result in
the next section.
Denition 3. For any type space T , a partially correlating device on T is a prole Q =
(qi; Si)i2N ; where for each i 2 N;Si is a nite set of signals and qi : T ! S; S = i2NSi,
such that
1. player i believes that when players type prole is t 2 T , the device selects a signal
prole s 2 S according to the distribution qi(t) 2 S, and for each j 2 N; sj is
reported by a mediator to player j:
2. For any i 6= j; t 2 T; supp qi(t) = supp qj(t):
3. belief invariance is satised. Formally, at di¤erent types t i; t0 i of the others, player
i receives si with the same probability, i.e.,
X
fs02S:s0i=sig
qi(ti; t i)[s0] =
X
fs02S:s0i=sig
qi(ti; t
0
 i)[s
0];8i; ti; si:
If 8i 2 N;Si = Ai; then Q is a canonical partially correlating device.
From the denition, partially correlating devices are subjective; for each i 2 N; t 2 T;
player i holds a subjective belief qi(t) over the signals. Belief invariance ensures that from
the signals that the players receive, they cannot infer any extra information about the others
types. Also note that the correlated signals depend only on playerstypes, not on states of
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nature. There is a key distinction between the partially correlating device and Liu (2005)s
state-dependent correlating mechanism. The latter assumes that correlated signals depend
on both playerstypes and states of nature, i.e., on states of the world. One can also view
the distinction as that between interim stage correlation and ex post stage correlation. A
canonical correlating device uses actions as signals, and thus the signals can be viewed as
direct recommendations of play.
Denote qi(ti; t i)[s ijsi] as player is belief on the othersreceiving the signal prole s i;
given that her own signal is si.
Denition 4. For any type space T = (Ti; i)i2N and any partially correlating device Q =
(qi; Si)i2N ; denote TQ as the type space generated from T through operating Q on T . More
precisely, TQ = (TQi ; 
Q
i )i2N such that
TQi = f(ti; si) : ti 2 Ti; qi(t)[si] > 0; for some t i 2 T ig;
and for all (t i; s i) 2 TQ i;  2  and (ti; si) 2 TQi ;
Qi ((ti; si))[((t i; s i); )] = i(ti)[(t i; )]  qi(ti; t i)[s ijsi]:
3.2 The characterization
The following theorem provides a partial characterization of the correlation embedded in
equivalent type spaces.
Proposition 1. We have
1. for any type space T and partially correlating device Q, TQ  T ; more specically, for
any (ti; si) 2 TQi ; ((ti; si)) = (ti).
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2. for any pair of type spaces T and T^ with T  T^ , there exist partially correlating devices
Q and Q^ such that TQ = T^ Q^:
Proof. Part I. We use induction to show that for any (ti; si) 2 TQi ; ((ti; si)) = (ti). First
note that for any (ti; si) 2 TQi ; (t i; s i) 2 TQ i; and  2 ;
Qi ((ti; si); (t i; s i))[] =
Qi ((ti; si))[(t i; s i); ]
Qi ((ti; si))[(t i; s i)]
=
i(ti)[(t i; )]  qi(ti; t i)[(si; s i)]
i(ti)[t i]  qi(ti; t i)[(si; s i)]
= i(ti; t i)[]:
Therefore, for any (ti; si) 2 TQi , the set of conditional beliefs at (ti; si) is the same as that
at ti. Furthermore, for any conditional belief  2 Bi(ti);
Qi ((ti; si))[] = 
Q
i ((ti; si))[f(t i; s i) : Qi ((ti; si); (t i; s i)) = g]
= Qi ((ti; si))[f(t i; s i) : i(ti; t i) = g]
= Qi ((ti; si))[ft i : i(ti; t i) = g]
= i(ti)[ft i : i(ti; t i) = g]
= i(ti)[]:
The fourth equation above comes from belief invariance. We have proved that for all
(ti; si) 2 TQi ; 1((ti; si)) = 1(ti): For higher-order beliefs, we prove by induction. Now
suppose for all 0 < l  k and (ti; si) 2 TQi ; l((ti; si)) = l(ti); we show that for all (ti; si) 2
TQi ; 
k+1((ti; si)) = 
k+1(ti): Denote the support of the l-th order belief at type ti as Bli(ti).
As a result, the set of conditional beliefs is relabeled as B1i (ti). By the premises of induction,
for all (ti; si) 2 TQi and 0 < l  k;Bli((ti; si)) = Bli(ti): Indeed, for any (; 1; :::; k) 2
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0<lkBli(ti);
k+1((ti; si))[(; 
1; :::; k)]
= Qi ((ti; si))[f(t i; s i) : Qi ((ti; si); (t i; s i)) = ; 1((t i; s i)) = 1; :::; k((t i; s i)) = kg]
= Qi ((ti; si))[f(t i; s i) : i(ti; t i) = ; 1(t i) = 1; :::; k(t i) = kg]
= i(ti)[ft i : i(ti; t i) = ; 1(t i) = 1; :::; k(t i) = kg]
= k+1(ti)[(; 
1; :::; k)]:
By induction, for all (ti; si) 2 TQi ; ((ti; si)) = (ti). Naturally, TQ and T have the same
set of -hierarchies of beliefs, TQ  T .
Part II. Fix a pair of type spaces T = (Ti; i)i2N and T^ = (T^i; ^i)i2N : Suppose T  T^ ;
we now construct Q and Q^ such that TQ = T^ Q^: To do that, we manipulate the type space
T^ into a partially correlating device Q and manipulate T into a partially correlating device
Q^. We then show that the generated type spaces TQ and T^ Q^ are the same.
Step 1. Before we start, we need a few intermediate results.
Lemma 1. Fix type spaces T and T 0. If ti 2 Ti; t0i 2 T 0i and (ti) = (t0i); then i(ti)[(;  i)] =
0i(t
0
i)[(;  i)];8;  i.
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Proof. With the basic property of probability measures,
i(ti)[(;  i)] = i(ti)[ft i : i(ti; t i) = ; 1(t i) = 1 i; :::; n(t i) = n i; :::g]
= i(ti)[\nft i : i(ti; t i) = ; 1(t i) = 1 i; :::; n(t i) = n ig]
= lim
n
i(ti)[ft i : i(ti; t i) = ; 1(t i) = 1 i; :::; n(t i) = n ig]
= lim
n
n+1(ti)[(; 
1; :::; n)]
= lim
n
n+1(t0i)[(; 
1; :::; n)]
= 0i(t
0
i)[(;  i)]:
Lemma 2. Fix type spaces T and T 0. Suppose ti 2 Ti; t0i 2 T 0i and (ti) = (t0i). Then for
any t i 2 T i that satises i(ti)[t i] > 0; there exists t0 i 2 T 0 i that satises (t0 i) = (t i)
and 0i(t
0
i)[t
0
 i] > 0; such that i(ti; t i) = 
0
i(t
0
i; t
0
 i):
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose it is not the case. Then there exists a t i that
satises i(ti)[t i] > 0 and i(ti; t i) = ; such that for all t0 i that satises 
0
i(t
0
i; t
0
 i) =
; 0i(t
0
i)[t
0
 i] > 0; it must be that (t
0
 i) 6= (t i): As a result, 0i(t0i)[(;  i(t i))] = 0:
However, i(ti)[(;  i(t i))]  i(ti)[t i] > 0. Given Lemma 1, this is in contradiction with
(ti) = (t
0
i):
Step 2. Using information in type space T^ , we now construct a partially correlating
device Q = (qi; Si)i2N which is to be operated on type space T . For each i 2 N; let the set
of signals for player i be Si = T^i; and dene S  i2NSi. Dene
Si(ti)  ft^i 2 T^i : (t^i) = (ti)g
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and
S i(ti; t ijt^i))  ft^ i 2 T^ i : (t^ i) = (t i) and ^i(t^i; t^ i) = i(ti; t i)g:
Intuitively, we are going to construct qi : T ! S in a way such that the set of signals
that player i could possibly receive when her type is ti is restricted to be Si(ti); which is the
set of tis equivalent types in T^i. Similarly, S i(ti; t ijt^i)) will be the restricted set of signals
that the others may receive at type prole t i from player is view, when her own type is ti
and she receives signal t^i:
We need the following corollary, which is immediate from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, in the
construction of qi:
Corollary 1. If t^i; u^i 2 Si(ti); then ^i(t^i)[S i(ti; t ijt^i))] = ^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t iju^i)]:
Dene on the type space T^ a prior p^i 2 (T^i  T^ i ) for player i as follows:
p^i[(t^i; t^ i; )] =
1
jT^ij
^i(t^i)[(t^ i; )];8(t^i; t^ i; ) 2 T^i  T^ i :
From player is view, the partially correlating device operates only in states of the world
(t^i; t^ i; ) such that p^i(t^i; t^ i; ) > 0: For each i 2 N; we can construct the belief system
qi : T ! S as follows:
qi(ti; t i)[(t^i; t^ i)] =
8><>:
p^i[(t^i;t^ i)]
p^i[Si(ti)S i(ti;t ijt^i)] ; if (t^i; t^ i) 2 Si(ti) S i(ti; t ijt^i);
0; otherwise.
With Corollary 1, for any (t^i; t^ i) 2 Si(ti) S i(ti; t ijt^i);
qi(ti; t i)[(t^i; t^ i)] =
p^i[t^i]^i(t^i)[(t^ i; )]P
u^i2Si(ti) p^i[u^i]^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t i)ju^i]
=
1=jT^ij
1=jT^ij  jSi(ti)j
 ^i(t^i)[(t^ i; )]
^i(t^i)[S i(ti; t i)jt^i]
:
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The expression of qi can be rewritten as
qi(ti; t i)[(t^i; t^ i)] =
8><>:
1
jSi(ti)j 
^i(t^i)[t^ i]
^i(t^i)[S i(ti;t ijt^i)] ; if (t^i; t^ i) 2 Si(ti) S i(ti; t ijt^i);
0; otherwise.
Now we prove that the Q dened above is indeed a partially correlating device. First,
for any i 6= j; t 2 T;
supp qi(t) = supp qj(t) = k2NSk(tk):
This is because from player is view, each t^i 2 Si(ti) is sent to her with probability 1jSi(ti)j ;
and that for each t^ i 2 k2NnfigSk(tk); there must be t^i 2 Si(ti) such that t^ i 2 S i(ti; t ijt^i)
and ^i(t^i)[t^ i] > 0; due to Lemma 2:
Second, belief invariance is satised: for any (ti; t i) 2 Ti and any u^i 2 Si(ti); the
probability that player i will receive signal u^i is
X
ft^2T^ :t^i=u^ig
qi(ti; t i)[(u^i; t^ i)] =
X
ft^ i:t^ i2S i(ti;t iju^i)g
1
jSi(ti)j 
^i(u^i)[t^ i]
^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t iju^i)]
=
1
jSi(ti)j
P
ft^ i:t^ i2S i(ti;t iju^i)g ^i(u^i)[t^ i]
^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t iju^i)]
=
1
jSi(ti)j
^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t iju^i)]
^i(u^i)[S i(ti; t iju^i)]
=
1
jSi(ti)j ;
which is independent of t i; and thus the signal does not provide extra information on
the otherstypes.
Step 3. Given the partially correlating device Q constructed using information in T^ ;
we can generate a new type space TQ = (TQi ; 
Q
i )i2N from the type space T . In T
Q; TQi =
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f(ti; t^i) : ti 2 Ti; t^i 2 Si(ti)g; and for any (t^i; t^ i) 2 Si(ti) S i(ti; t ijt^i);
Qi ((ti; t^i))[((t i; t^ i); )] = i(ti)[(t i; )] 
^i(t^i)[t^ i]
^i(t^i)[S i(ti; t ijt^i)]
:
Similarly, we can construct another partially correlating device Q^ using information in
the type space T; and generate a new type space T^ Q^ from T^ . In T^ Q^; T^ Q^i = f(t^i; ti) : t^i 2
T^i; ti 2 Si(t^i)g; and for any (ti; t i) 2 Si(t^i) S i(t^i; t^ ijti);
Q^i ((t^i; ti))[((t^ i; t i); )] = ^i(t^i)[(t^ i; )] 
i(ti)[t i]
i(ti)[S i(t^i; t^ ijti)]
:
It is straightforward that TQi = T^
Q^
i ;8i 2 N: Now we show Qi ((ti; t^i)) = Q^i ((t^i; ti)): By
the denition; for any (ti; t i) and (t^i; t^ i) 2 Si(ti)S i(ti; t ijt^i); we know that i(ti; t i) =
^i(t^i; t^ i) = ; (t i) = (t^ i) =  i; for some  and  i. We can decompose the belief 
Q
i as
follows:
Qi ((ti; t^i))[((t i; t^ i); )]
= i(ti; t i)[]  i(ti)[t i]  ^i(t^i)[t^ i]
^i(t^i)[ft^0 i : (t^0 i) = (t i); ^i(t^i; t^0 i) = i(ti; t i)g]
= i(ti; t i)[]  i(ti)[t i]  ^i(t^i)[t^ i]
i(ti)[(;  i)]
:
Similarly, Q^i ((t^i; ti))[((t^ i; t i); )] can also be decomposed:
Q^i ((t^i; ti))[((t^ i; t i); )] = ^i(t^i; t^ i)[] 
^i(t^i)[t^ i]  i(ti)[t i]
^i(t^i)[(;  i)]
:
We compare Qi and 
Q^
i term by term. First, i(ti; t i)[] = ^i(t^i; t^ i)[]: Second, i(ti)[t i] 
^i(t^i)[t^ i] = ^i(t^i)[t^ i]  i(ti)[t i]: Third, from Lemma 1, i(ti)[(;  i)] = ^i(t^i)[(;  i)]:
Since for any i 2 N; (ti; t^i) 2 TQi = T^ Q^i ; Qi ((ti; t^i)) = Q^i ((t^i; ti)); we have TQ = T^ Q^.
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4 The Bayesian solution
4.1 Denition
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete in-
formation proposed by Forges (1993). Its denition is inspired by Aumanns Bayesian view
and aims at capturing Bayesian rationality.
Following Forges (2006), the denition of the Bayesian solution involves the use of an
epistemic model Y = (Y; #; (Si; i; i; pi)i2N) into which the type space T = (Ti; i)i2N can
be embedded2. In the epistemic model, Y is the set of states of the world which is large
enough to characterize uncertainties in states of nature, agentstypes, and agentsactions, Si
denotes player is informational partition, and pi is player is subjective prior. The mapping
# : Y !  indicates the state of nature, i : Y ! Ti indicates player is type, and i : Y ! Ai
indicates is action. Both i and i are assumed to be Si measurable, thus given any state,
player i knows both her type and action. The consistency in probabilities requires that for
any measurable subset S  T i  and S 0  T i;
pi[( i; #) 1(S)jSi] = i[Sji]; (4.1)
pi[ i 1(S 0)jSi] = pi[ i 1(S 0)ji];8i 2 N:
The rst condition requires that the epistemic model does not give players more infor-
mation on the joint distribution of the otherstypes and states of nature, and the second
2Forgess denition of the Bayesian solution is restricted to two-player games for type spaces with common
priors; what we present here is the n-player non-common prior anaologue of her denition.
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condition further requires it does not give more information on the otherstypes. The two
conditions together, guarantees belief invariance (the invariance of conditional beliefs). Given
the epistemic model, we can dene Bayesian rationality for player i: player i is Bayesian
rational if
E[gi(i;  i; #)jSi]  E[gi(ai;  i; #)jSi];8ai 2 Ai;
where the expectation is taken over T i and .
Denition 5. Given a game G and a type space T , a Bayesian solution for the game is an
epistemic model Y = (Y; #; (Si; i; i; pi)i2N) constructed as above that satises the Bayesian
rationality of every player.
For any Bayesian solution Y , let i(y) 2 (  A i) be player is belief over states of
nature and the othersactions in the state of the world y, and (y) = (i(y))i2N be a prole
of playersbeliefs. Denote the set of payo¤s of player i in a Bayesian solution Y as
Bi(Y ) = fgi = max
ai2Ai
gi(ai; i(y)) : y 2 Y g;
and let B(Y )  (Bi(Y ))i2N 2 RN . From a point of view analogous to the "revelation
principle" in the mechanism literature, Forges (2006) characterizes Bayesian solutions with
partially correlating devices.
Proposition 2. For any game G and type space T , the set of payo¤s B(Y ) from a Bayesian
solution Y can be achieved by a canonical partially correlating device, Q = (qi; Ai)i2N ; that
is incentive compatible, i.e., such that each player does not have incentive to deviate from
the mediators recommendation.
We can also view B(Y ) as the set of playerspayo¤s from the set of Bayesian Nash equi-
libria in the game G with type space TQ. Alternatively, any incentive compatible canonical
partially correlating device Q is itself a Bayesian solution.
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4.2 Invariance of the Bayesian solution
It is not a coincidence that both the characterization of correlations embedded in equiv-
alent type spaces and the implementation of the Bayesian solution involve using partially
correlating devices.
For any game G and any type space T , denote the set of playersall possible payo¤s from
Bayesian solutions as
B(G; T ) = fg = (gi)i2N 2 RN : g 2 B(Y ) for some Bayesian solution Y of Gg:
Denote playersall possible interim payo¤s from Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game G
with type space T as NE(G; T ). The result below states that the set of playerspayo¤s from
Bayesian solutions at a type space is exactly the union of Bayesian Nash equilibria payo¤s
in equivalent type spaces.
Proposition 3. B(G; T ) = [fT^ :T^TgNE(G; T^ ):
Proof. First, notice that each Bayesian solution Y corresponds to a partially correlating
device and the payo¤s from Y can be implemented by a canonical partially correlating
device. Therefore, B(G; T ) is equivalent to the union of Bayesian Nash equilibria payo¤s in
type spaces generated from T by partially correlating devices. Denote the set of partially
correlating devices on T as Q; then
Lemma 3. B(G; T ) = [fQ:Q2QgNE(G; TQ):
Now we only need to show that for any T^  T , there exists Q 2 Q, such thatNE(G; T^ ) 
NE(G; TQ). Suppose T^  T , Proposition 1 ensures that there exists partially correlating
devices Q^ and Q such that T^ Q^ = TQ.
Lemma 4. For any partially correlating devices Q^ on T^ ; NE(G; T^ )  NE(G; T^ Q^):
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Proof of this lemma is straightforward in that any Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (G; T^ )
can be replicated in (G; T^ Q^), provided that when facing type space T^ Q^; all players choose to
use only information in T^ and ignore the signals sending from Q^.
As a result, [fT^ :T^TgNE(G; T^ )  [fQ:Q2QgNE(G; TQ); and since TQ  T for each Q,
they must be equal.
It is immediate from Proposition 3 that if two type spaces represent the same set of
-hierarchies of beliefs, they must induce the same set of Bayesian solution payo¤s in any
game. In other words, the Bayesian solution is invariant on the equivalent class of type
spaces.
Corollary 2. If two type spaces T^ and T are equivalent in -hierarchies of beliefs, i.e.,
T^  T; then B(G; T ) = B(G; T^ ):
Proof. Notice that if T^  T , then the expressions in Proposition 3 for B(G; T^ ) and B(G; T^ )
are the same.
Remark 1. Both the characterization of interim-stage correlations and the invariance result
above parallel with Liu (2005). Liu characterizes ex-post correlations with state-dependent
correlating mechanisms and based on that denes another notion of correlated equilibrium,
which turns out to be equivalent with the universal Bayesian solution proposed by Forges
(1993).
5 Conclusion
We study the correlations embedded in type spaces with the same set of hierarchies of beliefs
over conditional beliefs, it turns out that such correlations can be expressed explicitly with
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partially correlating devices, which operate in the interim stage of the game.
With these results, we compare two closely related literatures side by side. Partially
correlating devices characterize correlations embedded in type spaces with the same set
of -hierarchies of beliefs, and implement the Bayesian solution. Tang (2010) shows that
-hierarchies of beliefs fully identify interim partially correlated rationalizability and that
interim partially correlated rationalizability and the Bayesian solution are payo¤ equivalent.
State-dependent correlating mechanisms characterize correlations embedded in type spaces
with the same set of conventional hierarchies of beliefs, and implement the universal Bayesian
solution (Liu, 2005). Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) show that conventional hierar-
chies of beliefs fully identify interim correlated rationalizability and also discuss that interim
correlated rationalizability and the universal Bayesian solution are payo¤ equivalent.
As we have argued in the introduction of Tang (2010), the distinction between the two
literatures is purely methodological, in that in modeling incomplete information, the former
adopts Harsanyis principle while the latter adopts Aumanns Bayesian view.
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